I guess the thought experiment i sometimes use is like:
> suppose I went to sleep, and when I woke up, I was in a room where I saw my original body still sleeping. I can either press the button to kill the original sleeping instance, otherwise, after a set amount of time the woken up instance dies. do you press the button?
I'm pretty undecided but I think i'd maybe err towards pressing the button? I'm not sure, it would probably be pretty dependent on the particular implementation
I think overall the feeling of being the brain upload would be basically the same, and the memory/sense of identity would be the same, but at the same time feeling like I am a copy, but not really feeling that bad about it.
What do you think about Boris/Nectome's claims that the same nanotechnology that would be needed in practice to revive a vitrified person would also be sufficient to physically reverse and bio-revive an aldehyde preserved person?
Great article! At Embermind, we developed a identity preservation system specifically for those involved in cryonics, DNA archiving, or longevity work, that provides a redundancy layer for memory and identity continuity, which is useful if neural recovery is incomplete after preservation or if future interfaces allow reintroduction of archived memory data via Brain Computer Interfaces. It's Cryonics for your memories!
Conditioning on AI going well seems like a big thing.
It seems like if AI goes well it should be a solved issue regardless (or the world should be different enough where current companies / methods don't really matter).
If it doesn't go well - we all die and noone is there to revive us later.
In my head only solutions to this are
a) view it as insurance for the time before we get to ASI;
b) aesthetics - cryogenics is just a cool, fun technology straight out of sci fi, so it's fun to be a part of it
I guess a reasonable subset of worlds where "AI goes well" are ones where it goes well by the mere fact of hitting a wall or coordinating a global moritorium, even if those are not that likely. So it still remains useful in these worlds.
Though to be honest, I do mostly view it as insurance for pre-ASI times.
Ie: it would be a shame if one died right before everyone achieves giga-immortality because you fell off a bike and didn't pay the insurance fee
Sparks is a low cost/quality alternative to Nectome in the aldehyde space.
https://sparksbrain.org/
I was about to respond with this
I'm curious if you have a guess about whether your upload would identify with the pre-upload as "the same person".
I guess the thought experiment i sometimes use is like:
> suppose I went to sleep, and when I woke up, I was in a room where I saw my original body still sleeping. I can either press the button to kill the original sleeping instance, otherwise, after a set amount of time the woken up instance dies. do you press the button?
I'm pretty undecided but I think i'd maybe err towards pressing the button? I'm not sure, it would probably be pretty dependent on the particular implementation
I think overall the feeling of being the brain upload would be basically the same, and the memory/sense of identity would be the same, but at the same time feeling like I am a copy, but not really feeling that bad about it.
What do you think about Boris/Nectome's claims that the same nanotechnology that would be needed in practice to revive a vitrified person would also be sufficient to physically reverse and bio-revive an aldehyde preserved person?
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/E9xfgJHvs6M55kABD/less-dead?commentId=Yy2JWZQetnxEPYndo
Hmm, plausibly I am thinking about it too much as a false dichotomy.
This does reframe it a bit for me.
Great article! At Embermind, we developed a identity preservation system specifically for those involved in cryonics, DNA archiving, or longevity work, that provides a redundancy layer for memory and identity continuity, which is useful if neural recovery is incomplete after preservation or if future interfaces allow reintroduction of archived memory data via Brain Computer Interfaces. It's Cryonics for your memories!
Conditioning on AI going well seems like a big thing.
It seems like if AI goes well it should be a solved issue regardless (or the world should be different enough where current companies / methods don't really matter).
If it doesn't go well - we all die and noone is there to revive us later.
In my head only solutions to this are
a) view it as insurance for the time before we get to ASI;
b) aesthetics - cryogenics is just a cool, fun technology straight out of sci fi, so it's fun to be a part of it
What am I missing?
This is true.
I guess a reasonable subset of worlds where "AI goes well" are ones where it goes well by the mere fact of hitting a wall or coordinating a global moritorium, even if those are not that likely. So it still remains useful in these worlds.
Though to be honest, I do mostly view it as insurance for pre-ASI times.
Ie: it would be a shame if one died right before everyone achieves giga-immortality because you fell off a bike and didn't pay the insurance fee